



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Highlights of General Goodpaster's Testimony  
before the Symington Subcommittee, June 16, 1970.

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Before the Symington Subcommittee on U.S.  
Commitments, June 16, 1970

In addition to Senator Symington, Senators Aiken, Javits and Cooper attended parts of the morning and afternoon sessions.

Morning Session

After General Goodpaster had delivered his opening statement Senator Symington made a number of remarks regarding the US economy and US defense spending. He said we had been spending at least \$35 billion on "foreign adventures". While the UK and France devote 6.6% of their GNP to national security, the Germans allocate 4.4%, and the Japanese less than 1%, the US spends 8 to 9% of its GNP on national defense. The United States now finds itself in a serious financial crisis. The dollar is in very deep trouble, the citizenry is beginning to rebel against a heavy toll of inflation and taxes. Against this rather dismal background, Symington asked "Do you feel that in any reasonable time we can get our troops out of Europe?"

General Goodpaster responded that the security factors that exist at the present time do not leave a margin for any significant withdrawals of our forces from Europe.

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Looking to the future, he indicated two potential opportunities:

(1) If Europe makes of itself a center of technological, industrial, and military power, it could make possible the significant shift in military strength required for stability in that area. Some practical steps in that direction already have occurred -- greater coordination, moves toward common action in the fields of logistics and procurement.

(2) If the Soviets were to decide that they were prepared to make reductions in their forces in Europe. Thus far we have no indication that the Soviets are thinking along this line.

Senator Symington asked whether we will have to keep our troops in Europe forever. General Goodpaster pointed out that many of the factors on which our presence in Europe rests are beyond our control. The magnitude and composition of Soviet forces require a "substantial American presence." As long as this threat to US security exists, we must maintain our presence. "Does that mean 25 years?" asked Senator Symington. "That depends on a number of variables", replied General Goodpaster.

Senator Symington said that we have always had in Europe the forces that we said we would put there. But the

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other allies have never been willing to come up with what they promised. Both Brandt and Kiesinger have recently told Symington that the allies are spending far less for their defense than we are. "Do you consider that economic stability is important to national security?" General Goodpaster gave an unqualified "yes". He went on to say that we need both good security and a sound economy. The two are interconnected. The challenge to the Government is to resolve these two factors. "Don't these allies realize what would happen to the Free World if the US economy crumbles?" asked Senator Symington. "This is one of my greatest concerns", said General Goodpaster -- that our allies carry a commensurate part of the load. Even if the allies carried their load, however, the US presence would still be required. There is, of course, an ongoing effort to improve their performance.

Senator Symington asked whether NATO has a meaningful conventional capability in view of France's defection from the military side of NATO. General Goodpaster replied that he had no doubt that the loss of France was a severe blow to NATO, although NATO has tried to adjust to this change. From the standpoint of a Soviet observer, NATO presents a highly diversified military force. The Soviets know that they will take very heavy losses if they come against the NATO force. In case of war, other weapons, including nuclear weapons, would have to be used in a matter of days.

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Senator Symington asked whether NATO would use nuclear weapons if Turkey were overrun. General Goodpaster questioned the Senator's assumption that Turkey would be easily overrun in the absence of early resort to nuclear weapons.

In answer to a question from Senator Aiken, General Goodpaster explained that NATO still maintains liaison with France and that we participate in some joint exercises. While we do not have the assurance that the French would be on our side from the outset of a war in Europe, we put the possibility very high. Nonetheless, NATO continues to suffer because of the absence of French officers from the integrated military structure.

Replying to another question from Senator Aiken, General Goodpaster pointed out that the move from Wheelus AB has presented several problems: (1) training, (2) a formerly friendly area now assumes an attitude that is not noticeably friendly.

Senator Symington inquired whether the European contribution to NATO has increased in proportion to their economic growth. General Goodpaster replied that it has not.

Senator Symington maintained that US troops in Europe are, to some extent, a "sleeping pill" for the Europeans. What we need militarily, he continued, is (1) control of the air, (2) control of the sea, and (3) we must make clear that we can destroy any hostile power if need be. General Goodpaster commented that the goal of undisputed superiority

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SECRET

5

over air and sea exceeds our capabilities, but, in selected areas, we can exert control. Certainly air superiority is essential to the conduct of any major military action today. He underlined the importance of having conventional forces in place on the front lines of Europe.

Senator Cooper, after asking about the number of US, Canadian and British troops in Europe, asked whether US forces are balanced between combat and support. "Yes", responded General Goodpaster. But it would be necessary to increase support elements in time of crisis because they have been reduced over the years. We would need more support forces to get full production out of our combat forces, and to receive the additional combat forces programmed for the theater.

Asked by Senator Cooper to compare NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, General Goodpaster replied that NATO's forces provide an effective deterrent against the potential enemy. But our sustaining capability, our endurance, is short. This situation would make necessary an escalation to nuclear weapons under a situation of heavy and sustained attack. We are stretched very tight, at the limits of the forces required to make flexible response work. Further reductions will mean earlier resort to nuclear weapons. Organized and in-place forces are what really bring NATO alive. Such an organized, collective force depends on a US presence of about the present magnitude.

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Mr. Paul, the Subcommittee Counsel, asked what would be the situation 45 days after hostilities commenced if both sides used only conventional forces. General Goodpaster replied that the variables are numerous. If the Warsaw Pact used its full capability over a period of "some days", NATO would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Over such a wide range of possibilities, associated with this type of aggression, NATO requires a wide range of capabilities to mount an effective defense. At lower levels of conflict, of course, there are situations where we would not necessarily have to go to nuclear weapons.

In response to Counsel's question, General Goodpaster stated that he would not envision losing a toehold on the continent in case of war. Counsel went on to ask General Goodpaster's views on the likelihood of four elements of threat: (1) Full-scale intentional Soviet attack: General Goodpaster responded that we must differentiate between gross and net threat (the net threat is what remains when we have taken steps to counter the gross, or total, threat). NATO's present posture reduces the likelihood of this type of threat, i.e., full-scale intentional Soviet attack. But, if we did not have our current posture, it is likely that such a threat would grow. (2) Unwanted hostilities developing, for example, out of Eastern European unrest: "This must remain an area of concern for us", said General Goodpaster. "The sequence of events might tend to draw

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opposing forces into conflict. This remains a relatively high threat." (3) A limited probe by the Soviets: General Goodpaster commented that this depends on what they are trying to accomplish. They certainly have a capability for this type of threat, and this threat makes it even more important that the US maintain forces in place in forward areas such as the FRG. (4) Political threat: "This is the concern that is in our minds continuously", replied General Goodpaster. "Unbalancing the military balance lays open opportunities to the other side to exert political pressure." Commenting on the general idea of threat, General Goodpaster said that, from the standpoint of his responsibilities, he believed we must address ourselves largely to capabilities because of the relative speed with which intentions can change and the slowness with which capabilities change.

Commenting on the Enthoven article in the October 1969 Foreign Affairs, General Goodpaster protested the article's assumption that you can "program the enemy." Such an oversimplification is an error. "We must recognize", said General Goodpaster, "the wide range of choice available to the enemy." If we do not provide against his options, then he will shape his plans to take advantage of our weakness. Enthoven's idea that the military is preoccupied with the "worst case" just doesn't correspond to fact. NATO seeks to address the full spectrum of likely contingencies. Similarly, Enthoven's claim that the military exaggerates the

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8

threat is unfounded. Certainly there are different views of the threat, but there is no "exaggeration" of it.

In response to a question from Counsel, General Goodpaster said that he finds impressive the continued presence of six Soviet divisions and about 100 first-line Soviet aircraft in Czechoslovakia that weren't there before August 1968. Any lowering in the effectiveness or reliability of satellite forces, as a result of the Czech crisis, has been largely overcome. Dissident elements in those forces have been weeded out. One result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has been a growing suspicion on the part of our allies regarding the value of the concept of "warning time".

Counsel asked whether we could convey to the Soviets that returning our redeployed forces to Europe, in a situation of growing tensions, was not designed to further heighten the tensions. If this were possible, could redeployments be made more practical. General Goodpaster referred this question to State witnesses.

Do European political and military leaders expect troop cuts after mid-1971?, asked Counsel. General Goodpaster replied that these leaders have made clear that they would regard such cuts as adverse to their security. In this connection, he has stressed to them the useful impact on US decision that improvements in their forces would have.

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Concerning the impact of the Reforger/Crested Cap redeployments, General Goodpaster said that we may have seemed to be setting an example. The UK, FRG, and Belgium set in motion similar reductions. If the Czech crisis had not occurred, the scaling down would have gone on and spread more widely. There continues to exist a question whether the redeployed US forces could be returned to Europe in time. This is a particularly critical consideration since, as hostilities go on, the inferior side suffers relatively more than the superior side. That is precisely why superiority is needed from the outset. Further reductions in NATO's forces would require a shift in strategy and this would fundamentally affect the nature of deterrence. We should really be thinking of small increases to improve some of our deficiencies.

#### Afternoon Session

Counsel inquired why we require more defenses now to deter the Soviets than in the earlier history of NATO.

General Goodpaster replied that earlier NATO defense policy leaned more heavily on nuclear forces, at a time when the US had nuclear superiority. By 1957 the Soviets had begun to cut into the reliance we had placed on nuclear weapons. This development made substantial conventional forces more important. The new NATO defense strategy (adopted in 1967) assumes both more conventional forces and more sustaining power.

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10

Credibility is one of the major concerns of the allies, said General Goodpaster. They have confidence in our presence. They believe it is the US presence into which they can weave their forces to construct a credible deterrent. Any draw-downs in US forces would call into question the strategy of NATO and its credibility. One of the problems is that we cannot establish precisely at what level European confidence is undermined by US withdrawals. The Reforger/Crested Cap redeployments and the removal of some forces from the Berlin Brigade are recent examples of moves that unnerved our allies. This produces a feeling among the Europeans that they may have to look for accommodation with the East. When Counsel quoted SecDef McNamara as saying that the allies misunderstood the purpose of redeployment, General Goodpaster replied that the Europeans are somewhat skeptical about the promises that accompany US redeployments.

Asked what the Allies would do that could limit us if we make substantial withdrawals, General Goodpaster replied that they would look for some degree of accommodation; this is a question for the State witnesses.

Senator Javits asked why our European friends are not more aroused about the Soviet threat in the Middle East. General Goodpaster said that State would be in a better position to address that question.

On MBFR, General Goodpaster said that the Soviets would want to investigate carefully, even suspiciously,

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proposals for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. If a stable relationship can be found at lower force levels, in due time they could very well come to the conclusion that they could help their own resources problem by moving to lower levels. Indeed, a proportionate reduction in certain areas could work to their advantage.

Counsel hypothesized that a US force structure based on the "1-1/2 war" contingency could permit the withdrawal of two divisions from Korea, two from Europe and demobilization of two of these four divisions. General Goodpaster objected that removal of two divisions from Europe would have a weakening effect regardless of the arrangement.

When Senator Symington asked why our European allies don't support the US in the Far East, General Goodpaster suggested that the Subcommittee should hear from the State Department on this question. Indeed, continued General Goodpaster, a considerable number of European leaders hope for US success in Vietnam; they think we are doing the right thing, but they are not prepared to say it publicly. When Senator Symington stated that our allies did not help during the Korean war, General Goodpaster pointed out that in fact we enjoyed a good deal of effective military support in Korea from our European allies.

General Goodpaster stated that the basis of European concern in the Middle East is that the Soviets have created a forward basing posture and demonstrated a readiness

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to move out. There is European concern that the Soviets are prepared to risk intervention where the outcome cannot be foreseen. Turkey, Greece and Italy are especially concerned over the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. All have been quite cooperative in offering training facilities to make up for the loss of Wheelus AB. In general, the allies feel the US will underwrite Israel's security. Therefore there is no need for them to intervene in the Middle East.

Responding to a question from Counsel, General Goodpaster stated that the FRG has not yet made a final decision on reducing its length of conscription from 18 to 15 months. Such a move, if it is implemented, would not mean that the Germans considered the threat to be lower. Rather, this move would be designed to reduce social problems within the FRG.

Counsel quoted a U.S. News and World Report article to the effect that four countries (Portugal, Denmark, Norway and Canada) contemplated leaving NATO. General Goodpaster pointed out that in both Norway and Canada the governments had consciously decided to continue their membership in NATO.

On the question of the nationality of SACEUR, General Goodpaster stated that there is no agreement among the Europeans on a European nationality for the SACEUR position. Indeed, when it came to choosing a new SACEUR recently, NATO was unanimous in wanting a US man.

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When Counsel asked whether the forward strategy is the best defense policy for NATO, General Goodpaster responded that we have no alternative to a forward strategy, given the lack of defense depth on the continent.

Counsel asked whether the problems in Greece and the selective restrictions on US MAP deliveries to Greece weaken NATO militarily and politically. On the military side, said General Goodpaster, the MAP suspension impedes the modernization program that is necessary to improve Greek forces. On the political side, he deferred to State witnesses. From the military viewpoint resumption of MAP deliveries to the Greeks would be beneficial, but it is a national decision, not purely a military one.

When Counsel raised the spectre of possible incidents at nuclear storage sites, General Goodpaster responded that he knew of no incidents since he had taken command. Steps that have been taken to protect our storage sites provide an extremely high degree of assurance that no functional weapons could fall into unauthorized hands. Obtaining one weapon, even though it would have been rendered inoperable, certainly would alienate the US without providing the seizing nation with anything useful. There is, thus, a powerful disincentive to try to seize such weapons.

Senator Symington inquired whether we have nuclear weapons in countries where the local population is ignorant

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of it. General Goodpaster said he could not speak for the people, but in terms of governments he didn't think that was the case. He referred the Subcommittee to State witnesses.

Asked whether he discussed nuclear deployments with the NATO Military Committee, General Goodpaster said that he did not. Asked about the Nuclear Planning Group, he referred to the Subcommittee's request for a further State briefing on nuclear matters.

Senator Symington closed the hearings with a blast at State, saying "We don't get nearly as much information on (nuclear) matters from the State Department as we do from Defense witnesses." He was concerned that by limiting testimony on nuclear weapons the Executive was infringing on the "advise and consent" clause. If there are areas concerning the positioning and uses of nuclear weapons abroad and which commit this nation, he said, they are in the realm of foreign policy that the Senate and the people should have a right to know about.

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June 24, 1970

Summary:

There was pointed disagreement between the Committee and the witness on all points at issue; the depth, probability and nature of reaction by Allies and by Soviets to substantial force cuts; the extent of benefit to the U.S. economy from a substantial force withdrawal, and the seriousness of the present state of the U.S. economy; the share of the burden borne by our Allies; the continuing need to keep forces at approximately the present level.

Senator Symington and Counsel Paul did most of the questioning, with Senator Fulbright participating to some extent and Senators Pell and Cooper present.

Senator Symington implied criticism of Brandt's Ostpolitik, and said he could not understand State's explanation of why it approved his initiatives.

Counsel Paul asked how much we would save if we returned 150,000 troops to the U.S.--a constant theme he pressed throughout the hearing. After some discussion Mr. Hillenbrand said that there would not be much, if any, net savings.

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Senator Symington argued that we should withdraw some troops in order to save the dollar. Mr. Hillenbrand replied that present conditions would not let us make sizeable cuts, i.e., those that would cut into what was needed for NATO strategy and to maintain the equilibrium.

Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out the overall advantages from spending abroad, and clashed with Senator Symington on the impact of multinational corporations, the Senator stressing the loss of jobs for Americans involved.

After some discussion of related economic matters, including the relationship between our European expenditures and inflation (which the Senator claimed and Mr. Hillenbrand denied), Senator Symington asked why we should do what was necessary while our Allies did not carry their share. He then asked if the Russians would attack if we took out two divisions. The reply being there would not be an immediate attack but a chain of circumstances would be started that would produce a profound destabilizing effect. Mr. Hillenbrand stressed the interplay between the effect on the Allies and the effect on the Russians. Senator Symington and Counsel Paul felt that it was not clear that all of our ties with Europe would be

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substantially cut if we retained 100,000 ground troops and our nuclear weapons in Germany and remained a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. They probed the degree of probability attaching to the danger of unravelling the deterrent.

Mr. Hillenbrand responded that political penetration was a greater probability over time than military attack, but that there would be grave danger of military pressure. Counsel Paul pressed the idea that leaving 150,000 troops in Europe would be substantial enough, but Mr. Hillenbrand related the cost thereof to the needs of NATO strategy and General Goodpaster's testimony. Mr. Hillenbrand said the situation simply would be the same if we reduced along the lines indicated.

Senator Symington made his usual lengthy statement on the economic threat to the United States and pressed for more European input. Mr. Hillenbrand denied that the Europeans expect reductions after 1970; rather they fear them, and are thinking about how to assist us financially. If we took out two divisions, there would be a loss of confidence in U.S. staying power and purpose, and there would be a likelihood of Soviet pressure as they saw the erosion of the Alliance.

Counsel Paul argued that we could take steps to arrest that erosion by working with our Allies and still save one-half

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billion in BOP. Mr. Hillenbrand retorted this was not curable by public relations techniques, and rejected Paul's suggestion that exercises and redeployments would meet the military need.

Pressed very strongly by Senator Symington to answer how much of a withdrawal would be too much, Mr. Hillenbrand replied that the present level was the minimum, and his personal thought was that any cut in excess of 20,000 more would be too much.

The Committee contested the argument that withdrawal should await MBFR overtures, and pressed to know when we would know the Soviet stance. Mr. Hillenbrand replied next fall.

Mr. Paul argued that U.S. reductions would be a signal of detente, quoting former Secretary Rusk on U.S. withdrawal after the Berlin crisis simmered down. Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out why this was not apposite, and said it was hard to find a precedent that such action would lead to anything except temptation to the enemy. He thought the Soviets saw NATO as stabilizing German dynamism and denied they feared U.S. attack.

Mr. Paul looked into the possibility of the Germans assuming payment for goods and services, a point Mr. Hillenbrand

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said we were studying and hoped to successfully pursue this fall.

Mr. Paul probed into the trends of the gold flow and the loan features of the offset arrangements.

In the afternoon, Senator Symington asked questions about why we let France participate in NADGE.

Asked about the attitude of European leaders in light of our own economic problems, Mr. Hillenbrand said he did not believe U.S. military presence is a causal factor in our economic problems to the extent that it is offset by the Germans. This was followed by a lengthy discussion of the gold flow, the true additionality of German hardware purchases, etc. Senator Symington argued that it was in the European interest to protect our economy by agreeing to withdrawals, especially since nuclear weapons are the real deterrent; Mr. Hillenbrand replied that the Europeans don't think our economy is going to pot.

Senator Fulbright asked if there was a threat of Soviet invasion. The answer was "Thanks to NATO, no." Senator Fulbright then asked if there was no NATO would the Soviets invade, and Mr. Hillenbrand responded there would be a great temptation; although probably they could gain their ends politically.

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Senator Symington again pressed "merely to reduce two or three divisions," leaving the rest of our strength intact. Why could not this be worked out with the Europeans?

Mr. Hillenbrand insisted the economic benefit would be marginal; and politically and militarily, a high risk.

Senator Fulbright nibbled at the nuclear situation and Mr. Hillenbrand referred him to the Spiers briefing on numbers. He referred to flexible response and the need not to withdraw these weapons and said they were not the principal deterrent although part of it; they were significant, but not adequate alone. Pressed by Senator Fulbright as to whether tactical nuclear weapons would be used by our Allies, Mr. Hillenbrand said he preferred not to talk about this and the usual dialogue on how he got his instructions on nuclear weapons followed.

Senator Symington and Counsel Paul argued against the rigidity of the U.S. position, arguing for a partial withdrawal, but Mr. Hillenbrand rejected suggestions that withdrawal of the size proposed could be handled. This aspect was probed from many angles. Mr. Hillenbrand insisted that a transitional period like the present was not the time to cut forces. After some further dialogue with Counsel Paul on burden sharing and improving the offset, Mr. Hillenbrand made it clear that the

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offset commitment contained no stipulation to maintain forces at current levels although there was a moral and political implication to that effect.

The meeting concluded with Counsel Paul posing the sort of nuclear questions he had raised with General Goodpaster, which Mr. Hillenbrand politely declined to respond to.

PM/JW:Joseph Wolf  
6/26/70

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